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The Charter, Government and the Machinery of Justice
JOHN Ll.J. EDWARDS*
The following is the text o f  an address delivered on the occasion o f  
the Tenth Viscount Bennett Memorial Lecture, 16 October 1986, in 
the Faculty o f  Law, University o f  New Brunswick. It examines the 
conflicts inherent when the offices o f  Attorney-General and 
Minister o f  Justice are held by one individual. Within this 
framework the author considers both the current New Brunswick 
context and the varieties o f  statutory reform undertaken in a 
number o f  Commonwealth countries to resolve this conflict — 
most notably through creation o f  a separate office o f  Director o f  
Public Prosecutions. J. L I. J. E.
L ’article qui suit représente le texte intégral de la conférence 
présentée le 16 octobre, 1986 à la faculté de droit de l ’Université du 
Nouveau-Brunswick lors de la dixième (,Viscount Bennett 
Memorial Lecture”. L ’auteur examine les conflits inhérents résul­
tant de la fusion des postes de Procureur Général et de Ministre de 
la Justice dans une même personne. Dans les bornes du discours il 
considère d ’une part la situation existante au Nouveau-Brunswick 
et d ’autre part les réformes statutaires qu ’ont été entreprises dans 
divers pays du Commonwealth, notamment la création d ’un poste 
distinct de Directeur des Poursuites Publiques.
To be invited to participate in this widely recognised series of Memorial Lec­
tures, commemorating one of New Brunswick’s most famous sons, is an 
honour of which I am very much aware. The lecture series happily com­
plements the Viscount Bennett Fellowship in Law with which, from time to 
time, I have had a passing familiarity in supporting worthy candidates. I 
hasten therefore to emphasize my delight in at last discharging a promise to 
visit the U.N.B. Law School that I made nearly 30 years ago when I first came 
to Canada and joined the faculty at Dalhousie Law School. It is a visit that has 
been too long in being fulfilled.
My choice of subject for this year’s Viscount Bennett Memorial Lecture 
deserves some explanation. In the late 1970s the then Minister of Justice and 
Attorney-General of this province came as an unexpected visitor to my office 
in the University of Toronto Law School. The purpose of his visit was soon
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revealed. In conveying to me his worrisome perception of a growing public 
disillusionment with the administration of justice in New Brunswick, the 
Minister was anxious to discover what alternative legislative or administrative 
solutions should be explored to restore public respect for the justice system. As 
it so happened I had examined this same problem at the meeting of Law 
Ministers of the Commonwealth held in Winnipeg in 1977. In the course of a 
discussion paper entitled “ Emerging Problems in Defining the Modern Role of 
the Office of Attorney General in Commonwealth Countries” I reviewed the 
existing sytems of justice operating among the 50 member states.1 These in­
cluded the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as well as 
those countries which have achieved independence since the Second World 
War.
One conclusion that firmly emerged from this review was the bewildering 
number of alternative approaches to defining the respective roles of the Law 
(or Justice) Minister, the Attorney-General and, where the office exists, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions. These appointments are no esoteric 
embellishments of the state’s authority. They relate to some of the most sen­
sitive aspects of government in all its three branches. Why, you may ask, has 
resort been had to so many different solutions? Each of the distinctive ap­
proaches, it is important to recognise, reflects the political aspirations, ex­
perience and attachment to democratic ideals of the individual countries con­
cerned. Those with unitary forms of government at least appear to have evad­
ed the familiar tensions associated with constitutions that attempt to delineate 
the federal and provincial spheres of jurisdiction in the area of criminal 
justice. Any precipitate decision to effect by a single stroke the transplanting 
of any one of these alternative models into a province like New Brunswick, 
with its indigenous political and social cultures, would almost certainly pro­
duce a worse situation than that which exists at present. Any disposition to 
seek a quick, straightforward remedy should be firmly rejected.
The constitutional differences of which I speak go to the very heart of any 
system for administering public justice. In some countries we find the 
Attorney-General drawn from the ranks of elected politicians. He is a member 
of the governing party. In other jurisdictions the office is held by a non-elected 
public official whose tenure is not related to the political fortunes of the 
government of the day. Again, in some countries the Director of Public Pro­
secutions exists as a separate office but is made subject to the directions and 
control of the Attorney-General. In only a very few instances is the chief pro­
secutor subject to the directions of the President of the country and no other 
person. More frequently, the Director of Public Prosecutions is totally pro­
tected from external pressures, the constitution expressly providing that the 
director is not to be subject to the direction or control of any other person or 
authority. These fundamental differences of approach cannot be explained in 
wholly abstract terms. It requires an understanding of the political cir­
cumstances of each individual country. I mention these notable differences to 
underscore again the dangers of seeking a simplistic solution to whatever real 
or perceived problems beset the administration of justice in this or any other 
part of Canada.
Over the past twenty years I have had an opportunity to become ac­
quainted with the machinery of justice in most of the Commonwealth jurisdic­
tions. I have also enjoyed the privilege of discussing with ministers and public 
officials the special problems encountered in adhering to the constitutional 
provisions that should govern the discharge of their official duties. It may be 
small comfort to be reassured that New Brunswick’s recent experience, assum­
ing that it can be totally substantiated, is by no means unique on this or any 
other continent. Certain events that have taken place in this province in recent 
years — I refer in particular to the circumstances leading up to the inquiry in 
1978 presided over by Chief Justice C. J.A. Hughes and the more recent fallout 
from the handling of the investigation and prosecution of Premier Richard 
Hatfield — have only served to fuel widespread questioning as to whether the 
entire decision-making process in the criminal justice system is flawed and in 
need of major reform.
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to providing satisfactory answers to these 
questions — answers that would satisfy the uneasy conscience of society — is 
the degree of public ignorance that exists throughout every Commonwealth 
country (I make no exceptions) as to the essential role and functions of the Of­
fice of Attorney-General. To speak in the same breath of the Minister of 
Justice, a portfolio that is often combined with the position of Attorney- 
General, is apt to create added confusion in the public mind. Reading the 
parliamentary debates, public journals and newspapers of the respective Com­
monwealth countries exhibits little of substance by way of public explanation 
of the Attorney-General’s special responsibilities as the avowed guardian of 
the public interest. Our law schools have no better record in this regard. There 
is a singular absence of any serious attention being given to this historic office 
in the teaching programme of the vast majority of law schools throughout the 
English speaking world. Little wonder then that the great mass of lawyers, to 
say nothing of the ordinary public, lack any perception of the delicate tight­
rope which the Attorney-General of every jurisdiction, national or provincial, 
must walk between the adjacent fields of mainstream politics and independent, 
non-partisan judgments.
Regrettably, an opportunity to examine these questions was lost when, in 
1980, the Government of New Brunswick, failed to execute the final instru­
ment that would have set up a royal commission to examine and make recom­
mendations with respect to the role and functions of Minister of Justice and 
those that derive from the Office of Attorney-General. Particular attention 
was to be paid to the major responsibilities of the Department of Justice for 
the police and prosecutions, and to the relationships between the Attorney- 
General and the provincial cabinet, the Legislative Assembly and the judiciary. 
After much reflection and discussion pertaining to the inquiry’s terms of 
reference, I agreed to serve as sole commissioner in charge of the royal com­
mission. In doing so I was conscious that the issues involved in the proposed 
inquiry were of concern to every province in Canada, as well as at the federal 
level. Had the New Brunswick initiative of 1980 been put into effect it would 
have represented the first such governmental study of the subject in the entire 
Commonwealth. The only parallel that I know of is the internal review in­
augurated by Attorney-General Griffin Bell in 1978 with the aim of designing a
more independent United States Department of Justice. The outcome of that 
exercise confirmed the difficulties in effectuating major changes with respect 
to the constitutional responsibilities of the Office of Attorney-General. Never­
theless, the conference convened at the University of Virginia Law School in 
1980 and attended by many of the past holders of that office, achieved its prin­
cipal aim of openly questioning the theoretical underpinnings that have guided 
successive Attorneys-General in that country since 1789.
The United States experience is not so very different from the Canadian 
approach to these questions. This will quickly become evident to anyone who 
cares to read the proceedings of the Virginia Conference. It will also assist 
those in the political mainstream in Canada who believe that fundamental 
changes must be made if we are to restore a substantial measure of public trust 
in the handling of criminal prosecutions. In 19801 viewed the invitation of the 
Government of New Brunswick as a challenge to contribute something con­
crete towards both the alleviation of the crisis of confidence that existed at that 
time and also to assist in developing greater public awareness of what should 
be expected from those who come to occupy the Office of Attorney-General, 
as well as those who serve as agents and representatives of the Justice Depart­
ment in whatever capacity. This lecture will make some amends for the oppor­
tunity that was lost several years ago. I take great encouragement from the pre­
sent initiative of the province’s Department of Justice in organising a forum 
on the Office of Attorney-General.2 The need to improve public understanding 
is chronic but there must first be a readiness to listen to the problems, the 
possible solutions and the pitfalls to be avoided.
To revert for a moment to the stillborn royal commission in 1980 and the 
significance that such a move represented on the part of the provincial govern­
ment, a careful look at the terms of reference drawn up for the public inquiry 
will confirm the Justice Department’s firm grasp of the sensitive and conflic­
ting areas of responsibility that contributed to the crisis of confidence. I was 
particularly struck at the initial readiness of the government, in the words of 
the proposed order in council:
[to order] that the officers and employees o f the Executive Council and o f the 
Department of Justice provide such inform ation, documents and assistance as in the 
opinion o f the Commission are necessary to  the conduct o f this inquiry and that no 
claim o f Crown or ministerial privilege be advanced by or on behalf o f the Govern­
ment o f New Brunswick with respect to any document or proceedings o f the Ex­
ecutive Council relevant to the inquiry.
It is not for me to hazard an opinion as to the reasons behind the last- 
minute withdrawal of the government from its commitment to undertake this 
extraordinarily courageous examination of the Justice Department. Identify­
ing wrongful acts or wrongdoings of individual persons was not the essential 
goal of the commission. Indeed, any such witch-hunt was deliberately exclud­
ed from the areas of responsibility to be covered by the commission. Rather 
the purposes of the inquiry were to evaluate critically the existing order and to 
point to those problem areas where change, however fundamental and far-
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reaching, might best contribute to a restoration of public trust in the activities 
of the Department of Justice.
Before I leave the events in 1980, and their relevance to every other part of 
Canada which faces similar problems, it may be useful to extract from the pro­
posed order in council the principal topics that were identified as requiring a 
fresh look with respect to the existing constitutional arrangements. Not even 
the severest critics of the government of the day, I surmise, could find fault 
with the breadth of the approach to this challenging task. Thus, among the 
agenda items contained in the commission’s terms of reference were directions 
to determine:
Whether constitutional and/or legislative provisions should be created respecting 
the office of Attorney General, including the method of selection and appointment, 
standard of conduct, tenure and his relationship to the Legislative Assembly, the 
Cabinet and the party political processes of the Province;
Whether constitutional and/or legislative provisions should be created respecting 
those officers employed in the Office of the Attorney General and connected with 
the administration of justice, such as the Deputy Attorney General, the Director of 
Public Prosecutions and the Crown Prosecutors, including the method of selection 
and appointment, standard of conduct, and tenure;
The process by which the decisions or advice of the Attorney General in the ad­
ministration of justice are determined, and whether or not the existing process 
should be altered to ensure that his decisions or advice are determined free of im­
proper political, personal or other considerations;
Any steps which may be taken to encourage or create the widest possible acceptance 
within the Province that improper considerations do not influence the decisions or 
advice of the Attorney General in the administration of justice.
So as to leave no possible area for doubt as to the lengths to which the 
commission of inquiry was expected to direct its mind when considering 
recommendations for government implementation, specific answers were call­
ed for as to whether the Attorney-General should be a member of the 
Legislative Assembly, a member of the cabinet, a member of the government, 
or a member of a political party. As every student of Canadian legal history 
should know, since the advent of responsible government the Attorney- 
General has always been drawn from the ranks of the elected members of the 
Legislative Assembly or of Parliament. This continues to be the constitutional 
practice in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and some, but not 
all, of the new Commonwealth states. This is not the pattern adopted in the 
United States where, at the federal level, the appointee is nominated by the 
President, as is the case with all the other members of the executive branch. 
With every change in the occupancy of the White House, a new executive must 
be chosen by the incoming President. In many other Commonwealth coun­
tries, such as India and Pakistan, the Attorney-General is a public servant, not 
an elected politician. In recent years notable voices have been heard in 
England, including that of Lord Shawcross (a former Attorney-General), ad­
vocating an end to the centuries-old character of this constitutional office. I 
detect similar sentiments in the remarks uttered in this law school in April, 
1986 by Frank McKenna, New Brunswick’s Leader of the Opposition, when he 
stated:
[N]o matter how political we are in every other area, the public have to feel that our 
system of justice is sacred and separate. For that reason I want this province to 
seriously consider whether we should build in that institutional safeguard of 
separating the Minister of Justice in some way from the role of the Attorney- 
General.
I have some sympathy with this philosophy since it embodies a position 
that I attempted to expound in a public lecture at the University of Toronto 
twenty years ago. Through no influence on my part, I am sure, shortly 
thereafter reform along these lines was executed by the federal government (in 
1966) and by the governments of Ontario (in 1972) and Alberta (in 1973). It re­
jects as unacceptable the combination in the one minister of the Crown of 
responsibility for the three constituent branches of the administration of 
criminal justice — the police who enforce the criminal law, the prosecutors 
who prosecute in the name of the Crown, and the provincial judiciary who ad­
judicate in the criminal courts. I must decry the solution adopted initially by 
the Government of Canada, copied by Ontario and Alberta and followed most 
recently by Quebec, in which the Office of Solicitor-General has been brought 
out of the cupboard to head a separate ministry with responsibility for the 
police functions in government. I view this move as an unnecessary and fun­
damental distortion of the historical foundations of the Office of Solicitor- 
General as the principal deputy to the Attorney-General.
Where the one Department of Justice is responsible for supervising the en­
tire administration of justice, the relationships between the police and the pro­
secutors can sometimes touch highly sensitive questions of authority. Of these, 
nothing is potentially more significant than the respective roles of the police 
and the prosecutors in the critical step of instituting criminal proceedings — of 
setting the criminal law process in motion. The handling of the latest Morgen- 
taler case in Ontario — in which the reasons for the entry of a stay of pro­
ceedings, following the police decision to lay an information, were delivered 
publicly in open court — illustrates an adherence by the Attorney-General of 
that province to a set of principles that are at variance with those provinces (in­
cluding New Brunswick) where not only are all potential charges by the police 
sanctioned by the Crown prosecutors before they are laid before a justice of 
the peace but, in the case of serious offences or in complicated investigations, 
the right of the police to lay an information is subject to the prior approval of 
the public prosecutions branch of the Justice Department.31 beg leave not only 
to question seriously the advisability of such a departmental policy but, more 
importantly, to doubt its constitutional validity.
On the subject of separating the Office of the Attorney-General from that 
of the Minister of Justice, some thought may have to be given to emulating the 
long experience of Australia and New Zealand where the Solicitor-General is a 
permanent, non-political appointment in the Department of Justice. As head 
of the Crown Law Office he is accountable directly to the Attorney-General 
but, in the main, the incumbent is accustomed to making independent deci­
sions in the course of representing the Crown in all civil and criminal pro­
ceedings. As I look across Canada I observe a growing concern with defining 
the true role of the Attorney-General in such a way as to demonstrate the in-
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dependence of prosecution decisions. Prominent among these discussions is 
the case for establishing a non-elected statutory Office of Director of Public 
Prosecutions. Underlying these expressions of dissatisfaction with the existing 
state of things are the inherent difficulties in convincing the ordinary person 
that an elected politician, when placed in charge of the machinery of prosecu­
tions, will be capable of casting aside all forms of partisan political pressures 
when determining whether or not the criminal law should be allowed to follow 
its normal course. Uppermost in the minds of those who place a high premium 
on safeguarding the independent and impartial exercise of prosecutorial deci­
sion making is the vital necessity of resisting improper political pressures.
In all of my writings on the Office of the Attorney-General I have 
endeavoured to express the reasons why I subscribe fully to this fundamental 
proposition. At the same time, I have also been at pains to explain why I 
regard it as essential to clarify the precise meaning that is to be accorded the 
term “ politics” when speaking in the present context. This task is essential if 
serious misunderstandings are to be avoided and acceptable boundaries drawn 
between, on the one hand, those political considerations to which it is proper 
for an Attorney-General, a Director of Public Prosecutions or any Crown pro­
secutor, to have due regard and, on the other hand, those kinds of political 
considerations which should never be countenanced. Unless this basic line of 
demarcation is recognised and care exhibited in defining the meaning that is at­
tributed to the term “ politics” when discussing this central issue, confusion 
and misconceptions will continue to impede any progress towards solving the 
underlying problems.
The terms “ politics” and “ political matters” when invoked in association 
with the handling of criminal investigations or criminal prosecutions inevitably 
generate suspicions as to the impartiality of the entire proceedings. Perhaps 
this should not be, but the public mind is often governed by irrational emo­
tions coupled with a deep seated desire to see higher ideals prevail among those 
invested with enormous power over the lives of its citizens. If particular events 
are seen to foster this strange mixture of cynicism and hope, it is well that I at­
tempt to clarify the relationship of politics to the criminal law. This relation­
ship embraces not only the responsible minister, the Attorney-General, but 
also those subordinate officials, including a Director of Public Prosecutions 
and the Crown prosecutors, who make decisions in the name of the Attorney- 
General. When therefore I speak of the Attorney-General my remarks extend 
to those who act in the name of the Senior Law Officer of the Crown. It may 
also touch upon the duties associated with the police and the courts.
Constitutional doctrine, deeply embedded in English parliamentary prac­
tice, dictates that anything savouring of personal advancement, of personal 
sympathy or hostility felt by an Attorney-General towards a political col­
league, political supporter or opponent, or which relates to the political for­
tunes of his party or the government in power, should not be tolerated if 
adherence to the principles of impartiality and integrity are to be publicly 
manifested. In short, the introduction of partisan politics into the criminal 
process is totally unsupportable. The lessons derived from the famous Camp­
bell affair in 1924, which resulted in the downfall of the first Labour Govern­
ment in the United Kingdom, are imprinted on the minds of every British
parliamentarian, Attorney-General, Solicitor-General and every other minister 
of the Crown, as well as those who come to occupy the position of Director of 
Public Prosecutions.4 This does not, of course, mean that the Attorney- 
General or the Director of Public Prosecutions should not have regard to 
political considerations in the non-partisan interpretation of the term 
“ politics” . Drawing this dividing line may be extremely difficult at times and I 
am the first to recognise that the interpretation of the relevant political con­
siderations may well be a reflection of the political philosophy of the govern­
ment of the day and of the law officers who are part of that government. Let 
me illustrate what I mean by legitimate political considerations. Included 
within this criterion I envisage situations where what is at stake is the 
maintenance of industrial peace and the necessity for having regard to the 
danger of exacerbating a labour dispute by invoking or not invoking the 
criminal law at a particular juncture. Other circumstances would embrace the 
exercise of judgement as to when and what steps should be taken to reduce 
strife between different ethnic groups. Yet another example would have regard 
for the maintenance of harmonious relations between sovereign states or on an 
inter-provincial level.
I fully recognise the difficulties in actually defining in advance what is 
meant by “ the wider interests of the public at large” , but I suggest that any 
problem the solution to which is capable of eliciting bi-partisan support is 
bound to come close to meeting the test of which I speak. Taking such soun­
dings may be wholly impractical and I do not for one moment advocate inter­
party discussions as a means of resolving the dilemmas that confront an 
Attorney-General in office. What I do support is the propriety of an Attorney- 
General or his agents having regard to these kinds of non-partisan “ political” 
considerations when reaching decisions whether (or when) to initiate criminal 
proceedings and, an even more sensitive question, whether (or when) to 
discontinue a criminal prosecution once it has been launched. The attainment 
of universal approbation for the handling of these difficult problems is an 
unrealistic objective within any parliamentary democracy. Demonstrating, 
however, a conscious adherence to the principle that rejects any place for 
politically partisan considerations should be a basic tenet that pervades every 
action that involves the Attorney-General and his representatives.
We in Canada — and the same pertains to Australia and New Zealand — 
are accustomed to seeing the incumbent Attorney-General sit as a full member 
of the cabinet. There are those who maintain that this regular involvement 
with the resolution of the political issues of the day is hardly conducive to 
generating confidence in the Attorney-General’s ability to distance himself 
from the partisan views of his cabinet colleagues when he is faced with making 
what are sometimes loosely described as quasi-judicial decisions. In these cir­
cumstances, if the right kind of constitutional principles are to be maintained, 
it may become necessary for the Attorney-General to stand up against the first 
minister as well as his other cabinet colleagues in the event that they oppose his 
intended course of action. Such evidence as I have seen, from the federal and 
provincial parliamentary records in Canada, points towards the erroneous
assumption that the doctrine of collective ministerial responsibility extends to 
prosecutorial decisions made by the Attorney-General. If left unchallenged 
this would mean that the final decision-making power, even in controversial 
cases, rests with the cabinet, who can force the Minister of Justice, in his 
capacity as Attorney-General, to conform to the will of the collective cabinet 
or else pay the constitutional penalty of resigning his portfolio. I know of no 
such sacrificial precedent in Canadian political history but in Australia, as 
recently as 1977, the then Commonwealth Attorney-General, Robert Ellicott, 
resigned his office rather than be dictated to by the cabinet, who were insisting 
that he, as the Senior Law Officer of the Crown, take over and terminate a 
private prosecution launched against former Prime Minister Gough Whitlam 
and some of his ministerial colleagues. A full account of this extraordinary 
episode in Australian legal history is to be found in my recently published 
book The Attorney General, Politics & the Public Interest (1984).3 In it I ex­
amine the divergent approaches that various prominent Attorneys-General in 
England have expressed as to what should be the proper advisory role of the 
office they hold in the shaping and execution of government policies. The 
marked disparity in these interpretations of the Attorney-General’s role — 
coupled with public criticism of the handling of such notable episodes as the 
apparent immunity from criminal prosecution associated with violations of the 
Rhodesia oil sanctions, the publication of the Crossman Diaries, the enact­
ment of a bill of indemnity arising out of the Clay Cross affair and the classic 
confrontation in the famous Gouriet case between the Attorney-General (Sam 
Silkin) and the redoubtable Master of the Rolls (Lord Denning) — all these 
events contributed to the widely publicised cry made by Lord Shawcross in 
1977 for converting the Office of Attorney-General in England and Wales into 
a non-political appointment.6 If for no other reason than the classical 
statements of principle relating to the independence of the law officers of the 
Crown associated with the name of Shawcross and made in the British House 
of Commons in 1951 when he was serving as Attorney-General, special impor­
tance must be attached to any pronouncements by him as to the essential 
qualities of that office.
In a letter to the editor of The Times published on 3 August 1977 
Shawcross developed a forbidding scenario of what will ensue if no thought is 
given to the problems associated with a highly politicised Attorney-General 
and an uncritical, compliant legislature. “ Responsibility to Parliament” , he 
wrote,
means in practice at the most responsibility to the party commanding the majority 
there which is the party to which the Attorney General of the day must belong. ...
That the present Attorney General has acted in the utmost good faith is not the ques­
tion. But it requires no great stretch of the imagination to assume that at some 
future date we might have a majority in Parliament of extreme left or extreme right 
persuasion with an Attorney General of similar view. True to the well known 
Leninist (which was also the Fascist) strategy, such a Law Officer might well con­
sider it his duty to manipulate the law so as to further the philosophy in which he 
believed or at least decline to enforce it in a way which would be thought inap­
propriate by his political colleagues.
5Ibid.
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You may find this kind of negative philosophy impossible to associate 
with the current state of Canadian politics, or as descriptive of the political 
scene in New Brunswick. What I can confirm is that in at least one of the 
Caribbean jurisdictions that I recently visited I experienced no difficulty in 
recognising the realities of Lord Shawcross’s analysis. I have also encountered 
traces of the same phenomenon in other parts of the Commonwealth but, what 
is I think more significant, they bore no relationship to the constitutional ar­
rangements in the countries concerned or to the antiquity or otherwise of the 
nation’s experience in independent government. Given a thorough understan­
ding and respect for the principles that I delineated above, on the part of 
ministers, politicians, public servants and those who shape public opinion, 
there would be good reason to look with confidence to the sustaining of these 
vital elements in each country’s administration of justice. Regretfully, I cannot 
say that I have found such respect and understanding to be commonplace.
The experience of both the older and newer members of the Com­
monwealth confirms my deep-seated conviction that, no matter how entrench­
ed constitutional safeguards may be, in the final analysis it is the strength of 
character, personal integrity and personal commitment by the holder to the in­
dependent character of the Offices of Attorney-General (or Solicitor-General 
in some countries) and of the Director of Public Prosecutions which is of 
abiding importance. Furthermore, the identification of these qualities, at least 
in my experience, is by no means associated exclusively with either the political 
or non-political nature of the Office of Attorney-General. Instances of in­
defensible distortion of the Attorney-General’s powers can be documented in 
countries which have adopted the public servant model of that office, equally 
with the occupancy by elected politicians of the portfolios of Minister of 
Justice and Attorney-General in other countries of the Commonwealth.
According to Lord Shawcross the time has come to question whether:
the once great Office of the Attorney General should now become one wholly out­
side the political arena and enjoying in the task of law enforcement the status and in­
dependence of a Judge. Of course [he went on] the Government would still require 
Law Officers to supervise and conduct Government litigation... . But the enforce­
ment of the rights of the public and the rule of law would then be given not only the 
reality (which I hope it still has) but also the appearance (which it now lacks) of com­
plete detachment from party politics. And the holder would be entitled to consider 
without fear or favour the effect which, for example, a prosecution might have 
“ upon public morale and order.” 7
This is a forceful presentation of the case for following in the footsteps of such 
countries as India, Pakistan, Kenya, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Malta, Cyrpus, 
Botswana, the Bahamas and the Seychelles, all of them sovereign states which 
subscribe to this kind of public-servant Attorney-General. Contrasted with 
this model is the long established tradition to be found in Australia (both in the 
respective states and its Commonwealth government), in New Zealand, and 
throughout Canada, where the Attorney-General is drawn from the ranks of 
the elected politicians but where, as in Australia and New Zealand (but not in 
Canada), the Solicitor-General, the principal deputy to the Attorney-General, 
is a public official.
Useful as this kind of comparative exercise can be it is not capable, in 
itself, of producing clear answers to the problems experienced domestically. 
However attractive the alternative model may be of a public-service Attorney- 
General, with no political ties or connections to the ruling party, I want to 
point out what I consider to be a fundamental weakness of adopting such a 
policy. Nowhere in Lord Shawcross’s exposition of the need for change is 
there any answer to the crucial question as to who is to be ultimately accoun­
table to Parliament for the decisions that are made concerning public rights or 
the institution or withdrawal of criminal proceedings. Assuming for the mo­
ment that the elements of independence and impartiality can be assured by 
transforming the Office of Attorney-General into a public-service appoint­
ment, what is to be gained if there is a corresponding absence of accountability 
in the forum where ultimately all government actions are subject to public 
scrutiny? Whether we are speaking of foreign policy, defence strategies, the in­
dependence claimed for certain police decisions, or the policies of the Cana­
dian Broadcasting Corporation, no serious case has ever been advanced for 
completely isolating the decision making process in these variegated bodies 
from parliamentary or legislative examination. The appropriate minister of the 
Crown must answer on the floor of the legislature as a central feature of the 
constitutional doctrine of ministerial responsibility.
In my view, this constitutional principle is too critically important to 
entertain any special exemption being created with respect to the exercise of 
the prosecutorial powers that would be conferred upon a non-elected 
Attorney-General. There will remain the necessity of having a Minister of 
Justice (or Minister of Legal Affairs or some such title) with a seat in the 
House of Commons or the provincial legislature, and of defining his authority 
in relationship to the non-elected Attorney-General or Director of Public Pro­
secutions. We shall ignore at our peril any attempt to insulate totally the 
responsible minister from the independent public officials who might be charg­
ed with the duty of supervising the state’s machinery of criminal prosecutions. 
Accountability and independence are not intrinsically inconsistent goals. Both 
are attainable even in the practical world, but it requires a shared commitment 
on the part of the political head of the Department of Justice and the accoun­
table public servants to respect each other’s roles and the obligations 
associated with those functions.
A move in this direction that I believe as almost inevitable is the establish­
ment, federally and provincially, of a statutory Office of Director of Public 
Prosecutions. That elusive element, public confidence, to which I have refer­
red earlier in this lecture, will not be satisfied by the creation of what amounts 
to no more than an administrative appointment in the ordinary civil service 
hierarchy. If the constitutional relationship of the DPP’s office to the 
Attorney-General (or the Minister of Justice) is to be clearly understood and 
the impartial nature of the director’s decisions accepted by everyone concern­
ed, there must be enshrined in legislation the kind of provisions that have 
marked the evolution of the original Office of Director of Public Prosecutions 
in England and Wales, commencing with the Prosecution o f  Offences Act,
1879.* The latest statute to be enacted in that jurisdiction, the Prosecution o f  
Offences Act 1985, marks the establishment for the first time in British history 
of a single, national Crown Prosecution Service for England and Wales under 
the overall direction and control of the Director of Public Prosecutions.9
Scotland has had a centralised system of procurators fiscal for centuries 
and has been urging the English to follow suit since time immemorial. The 
dawn of a new era in Britain in terms of policing and prosecutions has truly 
begun. Under the new arrangements the Attorney-General remains as the 
minister responsible to Parliament for the new service. Its creation now is 
directly attributable to the recommendations of the Royal Commission on 
Criminal Procedure which visited Canada in the late 1970s and noted an in­
creasing attachment in this country to full time prosecutors. Meanwhile, there 
has been a flurry of legislative activity in this same field in Australia. Both in 
the federal jurisdiction (in 1984) and in the states of Victoria (1983) and 
Queensland (1985) a statutory Office of Director of Public Prosecutions has 
been established as an essential part of the administration of justice.10 There 
are also rumbles to be heard in one of the Canadian provinces that a more visi­
ble divorce of the government and, in particular, the political Attorney- 
General, from day-to-day decision making in the field of criminal prosecutions 
can best be demonstrated by the creation of a statutory, and thereby indepen­
dent, Director of Public Prosecutions. The central question — how indepen­
dent? — is rarely understood in its fullest ramifications and yet this is the nub 
of the public accountability debate that quickly surfaces when dissatisfaction 
is expressed with the handling of highly publicised prosecutions.
To respond intelligently to the arguments surrounding the degree of in­
dependence that should be accorded to any state official it is necessary to have 
careful regard to the language used in originally defining the powers associated 
with that office and the reporting relationships of the office holder to his 
political superiors. This becomes increasingly evident when the duties and 
powers are the subject of legislative action incorporated in an act of parlia­
ment or an act of the appropriate legislature. Whether it pertains to the 
Attorney-General, the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Office of Crown 
Attorney, the determination of the precise scope of independent authority 
must be found in the statutory language used in each case. The creation within 
a Department of Justice or Department of the Attorney-General (whatever the 
nomenclature that is used in a particular jurisdiction) of a civil-service position 
designated as the “ Director of Public Prosecutions” or “ Director of Crown 
Attorneys” contains little, if any, independent discretion other than that 
which is delegated to the official by the minister in charge of that government 
department. Thus, in Saskatchewan, New Brunswick and' Ontario — those 
provinces which have created a DPP’s office or its equivalent by executive 
decree — the director is a public servant whose status and powers, including 
his relationship to the Crown prosecutors, is dependent on his rank within the
* Prosecution o f Offences Act, 1879 (U.K.), 42 & 43 Viet., c. 22.
9Prosecution o f Offences Act 1985 (U.K.), 1985, c. 23.
10Director o f Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Aust.), 1983, no. 113; Director o f Public Prosecutions Act 1982 
(Victoria) 1982, no. 9848; Director o f Public Prosecutions Act 1984 (Queensland) 1984, no. 95.
department. The absence of express statutory authority means that the direc­
tor derives all his authority from the Office of the Attorney-General and is, 
therefore, directly accountable to, and subject to, the instructions of the 
Attorney-General and the Deputy Attorney-General.
Detailed analysis of the various formulae to be found in the statutes of 
other countries is out of the question in this lecture. There are, however, some 
pertinent lessons to be drawn from other countries that I would like to inject 
into the ongoing public debate surrounding the role of the Attorney-General in 
the area of criminal prosecutions. With more than a century of experience in 
having a statutory Office of Director of Public Prosecutions it may be 
especially valuable to understand the constitutional position that has always 
governed the respective responsibilities of the director and the Attorney- 
General in England and Wales. The basic concept is that of 
“ superintendence” of the director and the Department of Public Prosecutions 
by the Attorney-General. Standing alone, the term “ superintendence” might 
suggest a lack of precision that could spell trouble when put to the test in a 
controversial case. It is the meaning accorded to the principle of 
superintendence, and subscribed to by successive holders of these key offices 
of State, that tells the real story and it was explained authoritatively to the 
House of Commons on 13 December 1979 by Attorney-General Sir Michael 
Havers, when he stated:
My responsibility for superintendence o f the duties o f the director does not require 
me to exercise a day-to-day control and to give specific approval o f every decision he 
takes. The director makes many decisions in the course o f his duties which he does 
not refer to me but nevertheless I am still responsible for his actions in the sense that 
I am answerable in the House for what he does. Superintendence means that I must 
have regard to the overall prosecution policy which he pursues. My relationship with 
him is such that I require to be told in advance o f the m ajor, difficult, and, from the 
public interest point o f view, the more important matters so that should the need 
arise I am in the position to exercise my power o f direction.
Since that time, the Prosecution o f  Offences Act 1985 has been placed on 
the Westminster statute book, creating a national prosecution service." In 
conferring upon every Crown prosecutor the powers of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, as to the institution and conduct of criminal proceedings, the 
1985 Act expressly provides that those powers shall be exercised “ under the 
direction of the Director” . Does this mean that the Attorney-General’s posi­
tion, as expounded to the House of Commons in the passage I have just 
quoted, has changed dramatically? On the contrary, his ultimate authority has 
remained untouched and were the present Attorney-General asked to interpret 
the significance of the major changes incorporated into the Prosecution o f  Of­
fences Act 19851 am confident that the governing principle would remain that: 
“ The Director still carries out his duties under my superintendence and I still 
have the power to direct in particular cases” . In other words, while delegating 
the maximum degree of de facto  authority and independence to the Director of 
Public Prosecutions the residual and final word rests constitutionally in the 
hands of the Attorney-General.
11 Prosecution o f Offences Act 1985 (U.K.), 1985, c. 23.
In sharp contrast is the language resorted to by the Republic of Ireland 
when it created a statutory chief public prosecutor. Its Prosecution o f  Of­
fences Act 1974 states: “ The Director [of Public Prosecutions] shall be in­
dependent in the performance of his functions” . The same Act envisages that 
the Attorney-General and the DPP “ shall consult together from time to time 
in relation to matters pertaining to the functions of the Director” .12 Consulta­
tion, however, is not to be equated with any right to give directions as to how 
the head of the prosecution arm of government should perform his functions 
in relation to particular cases or generally. Elsewhere, I have concluded that:
If the experience o f other Commonwealth countries, which have adopted into their 
constitutions a similar model o f an unaccountable public prosecutor, is any pointer 
to what lies in store for the Republic o f Ireland it is only a m atter o f time before the 
fundamental questions o f control and accountability force themselves before its 
elected Parliament for intense debate.13
At the beginning of this lecture I mentioned the intense activity in the field 
of public prosecutions that has been a feature of the Australian political scene 
in recent years. It all stemmed from intense public dissatisfaction with the 
handling of a series of investigations and prosecutions involving corruption on 
a massive scale by elected public officials. Leading the way in responding to 
these pressures for change were the Commonwealth Government of Australia 
and the State of Victoria, both of which have placed their faith in the establish­
ment of a statutory Office of Director of Public Prosecutions. In the main 
their approach is similar but a closer look at the respective enactments reveals 
some very significant differences with respect to the issuance of directives em­
bodying the principles to be taken into consideration when making decisions to 
institute, continue or terminate criminal proceedings. These directives or 
guidelines are intended to govern the manner in which the police and locally 
based prosecutors make decisions and are to be issued in the name of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions. So far as Australia is concerned, there is no 
question of not making the contents of these prosecution guidelines accessible 
to the general public. This goal is taken as self-evident, thus following the 
precedents set earlier by the Attorney-General of the United States and the 
Attorney-General of England and Wales.
These initiatives demonstrate an important development in the doctrine of 
public accountability as it pertains to criminal prosecutions. In another recent 
public lecture I have argued the case in favour of following the Australian, 
British and American initiatives here in Canada. To neglect to do so will, in my 
view, prompt a challenge in the courts based upon the government’s failure to 
observe one of the principles of fundamental justice enshrined in section 7 of 
the Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms.14 Public accessibility to such pro­
secutorial guidelines is ensured in Australia by imposing a statutory obligation 
to publish the contents in the Official Gazette. Not all of us regard this stan­
dard government publication as our prime form of leisure reading but it is 
always there for the purposes of ascertaining accurate, detailed information
121974 22.
13The Attorney General, supra, note 1 at 268.
14Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
about the activities of government and government agencies. The English ap­
proach, provided for in the Prosecution o f  Offences A ct 1985, is more cir­
cumspect and, in my view, less satisfactory, being content to have the 
guidelines included in the DPP’s annual report to Parliament. The time factor 
may not be that important, but if it should prove to be otherwise then the 
obligation to disclose the contents of new directives promptly is a better 
safeguard for ensuring effective questioning by the members of the 
Legislature.
So far I have been referring to formal directives that incorporate general 
considerations — the kind of policy factors that will have different applica­
tions to varying circumstances. Debate as to the abstract merits of this or that 
combination of variables in hypothetical cases, however, rarely evokes the 
kind of repercussions that actual cases can be counted upon to generate. If the 
accused is a political or other public figure — and questions of non­
prosecution or non-enforcement become known — public reaction is likely to 
be magnified proportionately. It is in these exceptional situations that con­
fidence in the doctrine of ministerial accountability is put to its most severe 
test. The State of Victoria, sensitive to the perceptions of political interference, 
has by its legislation denied the newly-established Director of Public Prosecu­
tions any right to issue guidelines or directives in relation to a particular case. 
Furthermore, there is an equally explicit prohibition forbidding the DPP in the 
State of Victoria from becoming involved in the conduct of any individual 
case. He must be content with the formulation of general policy directives.
In striking contrast to this insulation of the most senior public official in 
the Public Prosecutions Department from the handling of individual cases, the 
Attorney-General of Australia is expressly authorised to give the federal DPP 
directions in relation to particular cases. These must always be made in 
writing. What at first sight, however, may seem like the conferring of a poten­
tially dangerous discretion assumes a very different character when it is noted 
that, in addition to the requirement that the written directive be published in 
the Official Gazette, the Attorney-General is also under a duty to notify 
Parliament expeditiously of any instructions that he decides to issue to the 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. Wisely, the Australian 
legislation takes heed of the necessity, that may arise in some cases, to delay 
the release for public scrutiny of the Attorney-General’s reasons for interven­
ing, where he is satisfied that the interests of justice require that the contents of 
his written directions not be disclosed at once. Such postponement will have to 
be justified before the House of Representatives when the case has finally been 
disposed of.
Difficult as this balancing exercise may turn out to be — adhering to the 
principle of openness while at the same time having due regard to the protec­
tion of the interests of the accused or potential witnesses — I see many positive 
advantages to following the system of accountability incorporated in the Com­
monwealth of Australia legislation. A wise Attorney-General, no matter what 
overriding constitutional authority is attached to his office, will refrain from 
interfering with the day-to-day decision making process that is carried out by 
his subordinates. The same policy should govern the stance of the Director of
Public Prosecutions with respect to the Crown Attorneys daily exercise of their 
discretionary powers. If the right policy guidelines are prepared in collabora­
tion with the Crown’s line prosecutors it should be truly exceptional to find a 
DPP or the Attorney-General becoming personally involved in handling the 
course of particular criminal proceedings. That remote eventuality, however, 
must be safeguarded if the position of the Attorney-General and the Director 
of Public Prosecutions are not to become empty constitutional shells incapable 
of discharging in full the obligations associated with the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility.
I sense an increasing boldness on the part of Canadian courts, perhaps on­
ly coincidentally with the advent of the Charter, in giving substance to the doc­
trine of judicial review as it pertains to the actions of the Attorney-General and 
his agents. The confirmation in R. v. Jewitt (1985) by the Supreme Court of 
Canada that the abuse of process doctrine is now an established part of Cana­
dian law derives added force (not its raison d ’être) from the legal rights 
enumerated in the Charter.15 There is no indication in the Jewitt decision that 
the Supreme Court justices intended to encourage a liberal recourse to this in­
herent judicial power; it has been stated both by the House of Lords (where the 
doctrine first emerged, in the ringing declaration of Lord Devlin in 1964 that 
“ The courts cannot contemplate for a moment the transference to the ex­
ecutive of the responsibility for seeing that the process of law is not abused” .) 
and the Supreme Court of Canada (in Jewitt) that the power is to be exercised 
only in “ the clearest of cases” and “ in the most exceptional circumstances” .16
I doubt that the courts, in asserting the viability of the abuse of process 
doctrine, have in mind the effectual displacement of the legislative assembly as 
the proper forum in which to call into account questionable acts of discre­
tionary power by the Attorney-General and his agents. On the contrary, as 
evidenced by the decision in Dowson v. The Queen (1983), the Supreme Court 
of Canada has acted in a manner that is deliberately designed to heighten, not 
to lessen, the Attorney-General’s accountability to the legislature.17
In determining the significance of the Charter to the subject of my lecture 
I draw your attention particularly to the terms of section 32. That provision 
imposes upon the courts of this land the duty of scrutinising all governmental 
action, from whatever source of legal authority it derives, if it can be establish­
ed that any of the Charter’s enumerated rights and freedoms have been infr­
inged or imperilled by the pertinent legislative or governmental body. The 
language of section 32 makes it abundantly clear that the potential reach of the 
Charter extends to the activities of the executive branch of government at both 
levels, federal and provincial. Cabinet decisions, as well as the acts of in­
dividual ministers and the departments over which they preside, are now sub­
ject to review by the courts to ensure that they are in accordance with the dic­
tates of the Charter.
1 s(1985), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 128.
16Connelly v. Director o f Public Prosecutions (1964), [1964] 2 All E.R. 401 at 442.
17(1983), [1983] 2 S.C.R. 144.
As the Operation Dismantle (1985) case clearly shows, the Charter has ef­
fectively extended the power of the courts to review both statutory and 
prerogative decisions by the executive branch and this perforce must include 
the wide range of prerogative powers exercisable by the Attorney-General.18 
The high-water mark previously represented by the decision of the House of 
Lords in the famous Gouriet case — upholding the exclusive right of the 
Attorney-General to represent the public interest and declining to review the 
Attorney-General’s decision in a matter involving public rights including the 
enforcement of the criminal law — has now to be viewed, so far as Canada is 
concerned, in the fundamentally different circumstances represented by the 
terms of our Charter o f Rights and Freedoms.19 The consent of the Attorney- 
General, provincial or federal, is not a precondition to pursuing a Charter 
remedy. The question of standing to bring proceedings under the Charter is no 
longer governed by the Gouriet principles.
Theoretically, section 32 of the Charter, coupled with the Supreme Court 
of Canada decision in Operation Dismantle, represents the potential for a 
dramatic change in the position of the Attorney-General so far as his accoun­
tability to the courts is concerned. Nevertheless, as I have endeavoured to ex­
plain in a separate paper on “ The Attorney General and the Charter” :
[M]ajor obstacles face the prospective litigant who seeks the intervention of the 
court to subject the prosecutor’s actions to a substantive or procedural reassess­
ment. To overcome these obstacles the plaintiff will have to adduce evidence 
establishing bad faith, personal bias or other grounds of abuse of the discretionary 
power. Alternatively, the evidence must point to the particular decision having been 
dictated by extraneous or improper considerations to such an extent that the basic 
principles of fairness have been violated. ... If reviewability is to be entertained the 
focus of attention must be on the process of exercising the discretionary authority 
[and not on the merits of the decision itself.] Permitting this extremely limited access 
to the courts for judicial review should not be seen as an erosion of the Attorney- 
General’s traditional position in relation to the Bench. On the contrary, it should be 
viewed as a legitimate avenue for the citizen to pursue and one that is entirely conso­
nant with the accountability of the Attorney General to the legislative body for a full 
explanation and defence of his immense constitutional powers.20
" Operation Dismantle v. R. (1985), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441.
19The Attorney General, supra, note 1 at 325-53.
20J. LI. J. Edwards, “ The Attorney-General and the Charter of Rights” in R. Sharpe, ed., Charter Litigation 
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) c. 3 at 67-68.
